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-- THE PRICING OF DUTCH AUCTION RATE
PREFERRED STOCK

...,

-;--

Daniel T. Winkler
Tony R. Wingler
The emergence of dutch auction rate preferred stock (DARPS) in 1984
created a new security which offer~ features to meet the needs of short-term
corporate investors. The instrument offers attractive after-tax yield~ due to
the preferential dividend income exclusion and an adjustable yield. In addition, DAR P S are recognized as being safer than unhedged "dividend-capture
plans." Dividend-capture plan,, where dividend income is "captured" by
trading into and out of high yield stocks, have recently become popular as
a means of earning attractive return, on cash reserves. The Wall St reet J ournal
(I 987:6) notes, that during the October I 987 s1ocl-. market crash, ... "corporate treasurers who had been earning as much as I O<ro after 1a,es on di, idend capture, - much more than from traditional ,hort-term investment,
like treasury bills - faced big losses."
This research investigates the pricing of DARPS and foi.:uses on the instrument's distinctive feature, to develop and test a pricing model. This study
of factors which influence the pricing of the in\trum.:nt is belie,eu 10 be the
first of its type in th.: finam:.: literature. This \\Ork complements pre,ious
research by Soren,en and Ha,\l-.ins (1981) on the pricing of regular preferred
stock, Winger et al (1986) on the inve,tment performance of adju,table rate
preferred stock, and Alderson ct al ( 1987) on the investment performance
of DARPS. Further, the prior research by Alderson, et al. is limited to the
201 dutch auctiom held during the introductory period of the in,trument
in the fiN six months of 1986. This paper lHilize, a ,ample o,er five times
larger than Alderson, ct al. spanning a 2 11~ year period.
This paper describi.:, important charai.:teristic, of DARP~ and develop,
pricing imigh1, deri, ed partially from call option charactc.>ristic~ implicit in
the instrument; de,elop~ a prh:ing model for DAR PS ba~ed on the developmc111s of the characteristic,; dewribes the data and presenh thi.: empirical
findings; and highlight, thl' major condu,ions of the resean:h .
C ha racterbtks of OARPS
DAR PS offrr a variety of attractive feature<, to meet the need, of short term corporate in\"cstor~. fhe par \alue is either $100,000 or $500,000, depending on the partkular bsue. The di,idend yield is adju,ted every fortynine days through a telephone aui.:tion of existing and potential purchaser\
as dealers relay buy anu ~ell order!, from cu,tomcrs to the designated trust
company. The a uction-determined reset rate is th.: highest of the lo" accepted purchase bids at which the entire issue can be so ld and refkcts market
conditions and credit ri~I-. of the i~sue. The forty-nine day intcnal corresponds
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closely with the forty-six day holding period required for the special tax exclusion of dividend income.
The auction re5ct has three important risk-reducing advantages. First, the
frequency of the dividend adjustment greatly reduces interest-rate risk compared 10 the formula determined yields on the older adju~table rate preferred
stock. Second, the auction resel more effectively prices changes in 1he credit
quality of issuers compared to the formula-determined rate on adjustable
rate preferred 5tod (Alder~on. ct al, 1987). Third, inve51ors who disagree
,,ith 1he auction-determined rate may ,ell the stock outright al par.
Like the formula -determined rate on adju,table rate preferred stock, the
auction-determined dividend rate tluctuate5 within a pre-specified range
referred to a, the "collar." The lo,,er rc\et collar (floor reset), normally 58-59
percent of the a\erage Aa commercial paper rate, reflect, the tax-advan1aged
naturt: of the instrument. The lower re,et collar rate occur~ when all holder5
of DA RPS decide to roll-0\er the a,,et nonc ompetitively. Conversely, the
upper collar rc5ct (ceiling reset) is normally wt to l 00- 115 percent of the average Aa commercial paper rate . i\5 market conditiom and the credit quality
of i,5uers change, the di, idend rate on sub,equent auctions can rise 10 the
maximum di, idend rate (ceiling re5et).'
Vir1ually all D \RPS i55uer5 n:tain the right to mil "'ith the call pri\'ilege
.:xpre,5cd in rno way~. Typically, i,5uer5 may call the ,tock al a premium
of 103 percent of par in the first year, ,,ith the call premium declining by
one percen t ead1 year over the 5Ubscquent three year5. Howe\'er, ,hould 1he
auction-determined di, idend yield e,ceed a hundred percent of the commercial paper rale, the bsue i5 immediately callable at par. Thi, last call condition is especially advantageous to i,5uers in the e,ent of an incomplete auction
resulting in the maximum di\'idend ra1c rc5e1. The incomplete auction "-Ould
re,ult in issuer5 incurring mun: dhidcnd expcn,c than they might choose 10
tolerate. The opportunity to call at par pro\ide5 a cost-saving exit from the
market under ,uch circum,tances. The,c di,tingubhing features of DAR PS
~hould he important for i1l\es1or, and pro\idc a framework for, iewing the
yield determination proce,5.
frnpirical Pridni.: Modd
The nature of DAR PS lend, it,clf to viewing 1he instrument a, an auctiondetermined floating-rate bond,, i1h ,pedal call feature5. The follm, ing func tional relationship is u,cd to e,amine factors influencing tht• auctiondetermined di\idcnd yields .
Di, , = f(CP,, UNCER,. RATE., OPTION,, CALL,)
when::
Di,,

The auction-determined di\ idend yidd of the DAR PS bsuc occurring at auction date (t ).
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CP,

.,.,.

Th<: average commercia l paper rate of 30-59 day Aa commercia l paper rate on the DARPS auction date (t).
u CE R,
T he ab~olute change in the Aa commercial paper rate, O\er
the five days prior to the auction datl' (I); a mca~ure of unc<:rtainty of market condition~.
RATE,
Binary variables designating Moody', rating of the i~~uc \\ ith
Aaa-Aa (Ratd), A (Rate2), 13aa (Rate3), 13a (Ratc-O and B
(Rate5) at auction date (t). The highe,t quality i\Sues or AaaAa rating ~ene a, the refcren..:e point (omitted regres,ion
variable) .
CALL,
A binary \ariablc representing the ~liding call pril'e of the issue at auction date (t) at I03 (Call I), I 02 (Call2), IOI .5-100.5
(Call3) and 100 (Call4) at auction date (t). 2 ls~ue, rnllablc at
103 arc the referenl'c point (omitted regre~sion variable).
SPCA LL, = A binary variable denoting a ~pecial call at par occurring\\ hen
the di\ idend yield exceed~ one hundred percent of the commcn:ial paper rate at auction date (t), and the i~,uc had been
previously callable above par.
The dividend yield Di\, i~ determined on thc auction date m 49 day intervals. Due to \hort-lerm nature of the in,trument, the more traditional }ielu
10 maturity or yiclu to call is not applicable to the analy~i, of D.'\ RPS. Sinn:
DAR PS a rc money market in,trumenh \\ ith call provi,ion~ tieu to commercial paper rates, the dividend rate ,hould n:,pond to commer..:ial paper rate, .
The tax-au\antaged nature of DARPS ,ugge~ts that DARPS rates ,huuld
change on a le~~ than one-tu-one ba,i, "ith commercial pap..:r rate.,. The other
marl..et variable, UNCER,, account, for intcre,t rate uncertainty. Previou,
research ha, ~ho\\ n a po~itive rclatiumhip bet\\cen i111erc,t rate volatility anu
the pncmg of bonu and prcferrcu ,tocl.. in~trument\ (l\larr and rhomr"on,
1984; Son:n,en and Hawl..in,. 1981 ). Higher ui\iuend yield, reflect inve,tor', compemation for assuming greater interc5t rate ri,k.
The crcuit rating of a D:\RPS i~~ue ,hould partially determine the Dt\RPS
dh 1dcnd rate (Sorensen and Hawkin,, 198 I). The a~,igneu cn:dit rating of
each i~~ue rcflc.:h a crcuit rating agency's a,,e"mcnt of the probability of
default by the b~uer on the par \alue or periodic di\idenu,. Consequently,
lower ratcu issue\ ,hould ha\e higher di\idend re~eh, reflecting higher default
risl.. .
Of ,pecial intere,t to I he I),\ RPS holder h the dh idl'lld rc,et ratc relative
to the prevailing commercial paper rate . fhc ,pecial call provision allowing
call a t par is in effect when the di, idcnd re\ct rate excecu, the t·ommcrcial
paper rate. The impact of the ,pecial call feature is greate,t tor lower-rateu
DAR PS, hccau~e the likelihood of the di, idend rare exceeding thc commercial paper rate incn:a,c, a, initially high rated IJ:\ RPS are ~ub~cqucntly downrateu. ' Under thi, condition, the potential \aluc: change tu the D.-\ RPS
investor i~ the diffcren,.;e between the higher mil price that "ould otherwi,c
exist anu a call at par. The di\ iuend yield ,hould increa~e a~ the auction
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process renders the issue to be callable at par, renecting the increased likelihood of a call.

Empirical Test!> and R(•"1lt:.
The Dutch Auction Ratr Preferred Slock llistor~ published by Salomon
Brothers, Inc., reports the auction reseb of 199 DARPS bsues beginning
in August I 984. Credit rating and call price data were obtained from monthly
isues of Mood} 's Bond Record. and commercial paper rates were acquired
from the Bank and Quotation Rrcord .
The 1st quarter 1986 through 1st quarter of 1988 time period was chosen
for this study.• Thi~ two-year time period represent~ a period in which a minimum of 15 auction\ occurred for 80 DARP issue~. Of the 80 a\ailable issues. 65 i,~ue\ had ,liding call provisions ba~cd on the Aa commercial paper
rate.
Table 1 describes the characteristics of the final ,ample in detail. Of the
65 cho.\en issues, 18 experienced at lca~t one credit rating change by '.\100dy's. The remaining 47 issues retained their initial rating 0\.er the duration
of the period. The complete sample of 65 issues had 1,142 auction, over this
two year period. The mean yield on Aa commercial paper of 6.65 percent
exceeds the mean DAR PS dividend yield of 5.27 percent by 138 ba~is points.
Table 1.

Selected OARP I99U8 Oat&

Character1st1cs :

Sample Size

Sumber of Iss ues

65

Nu~ber ot Issues vith Rating Changes

18

1,142

Total Nu~ber of Auctions

4J8

Aaa Rating (Auctions)
Aal to AaJ Rating (Auctions)

160

Al to AJ Rating (Auctions)

474

47

Baal to BaaJ Rating (Auctions)

7

Bal to BaJ Rating (Auctions)
Bl to 83 Rating (Auctions)

16

Auctions with Dividend Reset> CP; callable at par

62
5.271

Mean Dividend Yield
Standard Deviation ot Yield

1.12\

Mean Aa Commercial Paper Rate

6.651

Standard Deviation of Commercial Paper Rate

o. 581

Mean sum ot Commercial Paper Volatility

0.3H

Std. Deviation of Commercial Paper Volatility

O.J91
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Regression analy~b wa~ u,cd to examine the rl:'lation~hip between DA RPS
dividend yields and the factor., in the functional rclatiomhip spcdfied in the
section on Empirical Pricing l\lodcl.
Because the Durbin-Wahon ,tati'-li,·, in the OLS rcgrc\~ion, rc\eal the
pre ence of serial correlation. a tran,formcd maximum likelihood ( !\.IL) mock!
was used to control for ,erial ..:orrclation through a j!l'nerali,cd difkrencing
procedure.' The I\IL modi!! ,·,1im,11e, the autl>rcgrc,~ive parameter and regn:,sion parameter, ,imultancou,I~ (.J,9). rl1c 1\11 regre"ion re,ult, are ,ho\,n
in Table 2.
Table 2.
Transtormed Maximum Likelihood Regression ~quation tor
tb• Pricing of DARPB with Dividend ~ield •• tbe Dependent Variable,
US& -

1988,

Explanatory Variables

tw!tl-1

Constan~

-0.015
(-0.057)

-1.00)
(-4.575)••·

-0,928
(-5. )04) . . .

CP (Aa commercial Paper)

0,784
(20.286)••·

o.909
(27-739)••·

O. B50
(33.206)••·

UNCER (Volatility in CP)

0,2)7
( 6,0JOJ• • •

0.216
(5.42)) •••

0.131
(),837)• . .

0.015
(O,JOJ)

0,067
(2.090)•

RATE2 (A Rating)

l1Q9.tlJ

RATEJ (Baa Rating)

1.426
(12.252)••·

0.746
(8.860)••·

RATE4 (Ba Rating)

J.843
(15,)44)••·

2.273
(11. 210) . . .

RATES (B Rating)

5.094
(26.395)••·

J.300
(21.618) •••

CALL2 (Call at 102)

0.18)
(J.81))• . .

CALLJ (Call at 101.5-100. 5)

0.358
(8.741)•--

CALL4 (Call at. 100)

0.646
(9,905)••·

SPCALL (Div, > CP)
Adjusted R'
Durbin Watson

l. 956
(23,477)••·

29.15
2,28

•sign t cant. at 0.05
••Sign t cant at 0.01
•••sign t can~ at 0.001
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61.28\

80-JB\

2.04

2. 02

The results of the ML analysis are shown under three specifications 10 highlight the marginal contribution of the variables. In each successive model,
additional variables enter the regression equation. Model (I) captures the
response of the dividend reset to prevailing market conditions. Specifically,
29.15 percent of the variation in the dividend reset rate is explained by the
commercial paper rate and commercial paper volatility. When the default
measures arc added to model (I) as shO\\ n in model (2), the explained variability increases to 61.28 percent. M odel (3) adds the call option variables 10
model (2), increasing the regression's explanatory power to 80.38 percent.
The F-\alue~ indicate these three models arc ~tatistically significant at the
0.001 level.
Consider the coefficients of model (3) found in Table 2. Model (3) regression coefficients show significant and positive coeffi<.:ienb for all variables.
The intercept of -0. 928 corresponds to an average DI\ RPS reset of 93 ba5is
points belov. the prevailing /\a commercial paper rate for 0/\RPS issues with
the highest rating \\hich are callable at 103 percent of par. As expected, t he
D1\RPS reset rates appear to respond to incrcmemal changes in the commercial paper rate \\ith a less than one-to-one correspondence. The cornmerical paper rate coefficient of 0.1150 is con5istent v.ith the tax-advantaged nature
of D/\RPS.
This commercial paper rate coefficient is based o n the tax laws from three
different tax code changes from 1986-88. Thus, the coefficient for CP renects
an a\erage value for the three years of the study. Given the tax rates and
dhidend exclusions for 1986-88, the a\erage after-tax yield spreads between
DA RPS and commercial paper \\ere 25. I 3 percent, 12.20 and I 0.33 percent
for 1986. 1987 and 1988 respectively.• The average of the~e three after-tax
,prcads is 15.89 percent, indicating a slightly higher return for DA RPS holding comtant proxies for the marl-et condition, -:red it rating and call pro\ isions.
The credit rating dummy variable, shov. significant increa~es in the D/\RPS
re,et rates for credit rating decrea~es. The A rated issues have a yield differential of 6.7 basis point., more than the highest rated issues. The difference
in yield between Baa and A rated issues is sub~tantially larger at 74.6 basis
points. Lowering the rating from Baa to Ua re~ults in a 153 basis point difference in the di\idend yield. The lov.est rated issues (8) yield 103 basis points
more than Ba rated issues. Gi\en the ta, disadvantage to the DAR PS issuer
of paying dividends o n an after-tax basis, low rated D/\RPS appear to
represent an expensi\-e form of financing short-term capital needs .
The sliding call price increase, the dividend reset, particularly those issues
callable at par. Investors require 65 basb points more for issues with the possibility of a call with a stated 300 basis point differential ( I03 versus 100),
and 36 basis points more for an average stated 200 basis point different ial
(100.5-101.5). The JR basis point differential bctv.een a call at 103 and 102
~ugge,ts investors believe the company is less likely to call the iss ue at either
of these prices.
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The significance of the special call variable (SPCA LL) indicates DAR PS
yields adjust 10 reflect 1he call risk presented by 1he special nature of the
ins1rument as the auc1ion-determined rate exceeds the commercial paper rate.
Investors require an average of 196 basis points yield <:ompensation for the
loss of the call premium.

Conclusion
..,...

This 1udy examines the pricing of dutch auction rate preferred stock by
vie" ing the ins1rumen1 as an auc1ion-de1ermined noa1ing-rate bond "i1h special call features. The commercial paper rale, call risk, and credit ri,k characteristics appear to explain and establi,h the DA RPS yields. The call feature~
require add itional yield when inve,tor5 are exposed to call risk.
Gh en the close correspondence between commercial paper mo\ emcnts and
DARP yields, DA RPS offer the corporate investor a clo5e substit ute for commercial paper. The decision to imcst in DARPS may ultimately depend upon
the in vesto r's ability to take advantage of the DAR P's preferential ta, ,tatu,.
E ndnotci.
'The dividend yield relationship can be conceptually expressed a s follo\\\:
Di v,

= I·, + Max[(Aucdh , - F.), OJ - Max[Aucdiv, - C,, 0]

The floor reset collar (F,) i, 58-59 percent of the Aa commercial paper rate
a nd is t he "guaranteed" minimum ralt! to the inve,tor, regardlcs\ of whether
the a uc11o n-determincd di.,,idend (Aucdiv,) i, lower than the floor. The second term refers to the excess n:turn abo.,,e the floor \\ hen the auctiondetermined di\idend is abo\e the floor reset collar. If the auctio n-determined
dividend exceeds the floor, the value of term two is (Aucdi\ 1 - F,), other\\JSe the term cquab Lero . Similarly, if the auction-determined dividend is
below the ceiling reset, the third term is zero. When the auction-determined
d i. 1dend
above the ceiling rate, investors incur a los, of - (Aucdi\ 1 C,), since the maximum dividend reset (Div,) investor, receive \\ill be set to
the ceili ng reset rate. Special thanb to the anonymou, re\ iewer suggesting
this option pricing insight.

1,

A sm a ll ~ampk problem result, when creating ,eraratc \ariable5 for calls
at 101 .5, IOI and I00.5 percent of par. Combining these call prices \ tabiliLes
the call price regre~sion coefficient.
'Most DARPS receive the /\aa or /\a rating upon initial i~suance, since
issuers collatcralize the principal and accrued dividends . The issuer must own
hig h qual ity short-term assets with a marlo,et value exceeding that of the outstanding DAR PS. Further, the discounted value of cash a nd money market
securities maturing within 49 days must equal the dividend payment.
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'The scarcity of DARPS during 1984-85 prohibi1cd an adequa te sample
size fo r a pricing analysis during this period. For consistency, all auctions
fo r various issues had to occur over the same time period.
'Statistical analysis was performed 10 con5idcr non linea r specifications.
Since the sliding and special call variable category dummy variables are contingent upon the DAR PS di\ idend yield exceeding the Aa commercial paper
rate, Ob\ervation, were ranl-.ed by the dividend yield divided by the prevailing Aa commercial paper rate. Separate regression, were conducted for various low and high percent of commercial paper groups (-l]. The linear
,pecification chose n for this ~tudy remained robust to these different subsample, of data.
''The after-tax DA R PS yield is calculated undt'r a -'6 percent marginal corporate lax rate in 1986 with an 85 percent e.\clusion, a -10 percent lax rate
in 1987 wilh an 80 percent exclusion, and a 3-l percent tax rate in 1988 with
a 70 pen.:ent exclusion. A, an example, a 100 basi, point increase in the commercial paper rate before ta\ during 1988 v.ould net the purchaser 100
( I - . 3-l)= 66 ba\is points after ta,. A corresponding 85 basi\ point increase
in the DAR PS rate \\Ould net 85 ((I- .30(.3-l)l=76.3J basi, point, after tax;
a 10.33 point differential.
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